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I make no apology for asking your attention at this time to a
subject outside the general current of your study and probable
practice.
This institution among the earliest gave attention to the study
of International Law. One of its greatest Presidents has con-
tributed profoundly to that study. You have recently in your
law publication been giving abundant space to the law of nations.
Your distinguished Dean made a notable contribution to the dis-
cussion of a World's Court. And now the presence in your
faculty of the distinguished jurist and statesman whose proposal
of general arbitration has signally advanced that cause, justifies
again the absence of apology.
It is now a hundred and sixteen years since the first arbitration
between Great Britain and the United States. In his closing
argument the agent of the United States, James Sullivan, used
these words:
"V hy shall not all the nations on earth determine their disputes
in this mode rather than choke the rivers with their carcasses and
stain the soil of continents with their slain?"
That arbitration concerned the eastern boundary between the
United States and New Brunswick, the St. Croix River boundary.
It had been said by Mr. Hamilton that,
"Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the
most fertile sources of hostility among the nations. Perhaps the
*Address delivered before the graduating class of the Yale Law
School, June, 1913.
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greatest portion of the wars that have desolated the earth have
sprung from this origin."
Certainly the progress of the world is sharply marked by the
change of view in this particular. No one now really contends
that the question of boundary may not be dealt with by arbitration,
or that the honor of nations is so bound up in invisible lines that
there can be no demarcation except in blood.
These words of Mr. Sullivan were far from being the earliest
expression of the aspiration toward peace. It was current in
the thought of the day. Only two years before, Kant had
descended from the realms of pure logic and abstract philosophy
to propose the Federation of Free States.
Bentham less than a decade before had set forth his proposal
for a general Diet of Nations to which each of the Great Powers
was to send two deputies, and whose decrees were to be enforced
by placing a recalcitrant power under the ban of Europe. Early
in the same century Abbe St. Pierre, far in advance of his time,
had proposed a General League of Christendom, by which war
might be abolished and the dignity and honor of states upheld by
peaceful means.
The time was not ripe. The centuries' old custom of conflict
was not lightly or swiftly to be put aside. The white agony of
the Napoleonic wars was overspreading the land Two decades
of devastation awaited Europe. Well might it then have been
said-and no doubt was said-that St. Pierre and Kant and
Bentham were mere dreamers, and that Peace was an inaccessible
Utopia.
Now, after a century of education, after the foundation of
thousands of peace societies, after councils and conferences and
conventions without number, again;
"The earth is full of anger;
The seas are dark with wrath,
The nations in their harness
Go up against our path."
The titanic struggle between Russia and Japan is scarcely over
when Italy crosses the Mediterranean to Tripoli; the Balkan
States rise against Turkey, and China in rebellion overthrows the
Manchus. The sneer is easy that the Peace Movement is a
failure, that law will never be substituted for war, and that the
true advocate of peace is one who is willing to fight for it.
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Of course, it is true that war has not ceased from the earth,
and it may well be conceded that M. Leon Bourgeois at the last
Peace Conference at The Hague was right when he said,
"There is a vast number of political questions which the condition
of the world does not yet permit to be submitted universally and
compulsorily to arbitration."
President Eliot has recently pointed out the causes that still
make for war. Devoted as we may be to the cause of peace,
and recognizing as the world does the hideousness of war, we
cannot regret the uprising in China or in the Balkans. The
determination of such struggles is not within the present day
accord of nations, or within the province of law and arbitration.
But they do not retard the progress of that accord or the estab-
lishment of respect for law in the broad and swiftly widening
field which they occupy.
Even our boasted common law does not in every event secure
us against appeals to force. England is not free from it in a
struggle for suffrage. Labor contests are not free from it even
under the shadow of the court house. Our law recognizes that
its processes in riot, violence and insurrection may be suspended
by executive action and that it cannot inquire whether the con-
dition exists on which the suspension is based. Constitutions
secure the public safety by this delegation of autocratic power.
"Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for
judicial process." (Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S., 78, in re Moyer,
35 Colorado, 159.
We need not stop with this reply. We may well consider what
the century has brought forth. Just now we are preparing to
celebrate a hundred years of peace between two great peoples
who had twice previously been at war in a third of that time.
We are thus brought face to face with the fact that for a century
the English-speaking nations have been at peace between them-
selves. They have not been peaceful because decadent, but have
overspread the earth and covered the seas with 'their commerce.
Rivalries and far-flung lines of contact, however, have not em-
broiled them. For well nigh half a century the nations of
Western Europe too have been at peace Burdened bmy arma-
ments, they have not drawn the sword. The peace of the Atlan-
tic has been preserved. Ships of war which would have sunk
Armadas in an hour sweep over it, but they have not destroyed
each other.
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Storm clouds do not disappear in an hour and leave clear skies.
We may wyell hail the fact that a third of the sky has already
cleared; that westward from the Vistula to the Pacific the
nations have learned not to war with each other. It cannot
be said that they have laid down their arms. Heavier and heavier
has grown the burden of armament, till nations, like knights of
old in chain and plate, stumble about or stand still from their
weight of preparedness.
The fact remains, however, that more and more they keep the
peace. When conflict has seemed inevitable, they have made
treaties or joined in arbitration. "Peace with honor" has been
cabled home, and the dogs of war have slept in their chains.
It is no part of my purpose to follow or extol the peace propa-
ganda of the century, notable as it has been, but to ask your atten-
tion to the part that trade has played in pacification.
Shortly after the conclusion of the War of 1812 it seemed that
the clouds were returning after the rain. No provision had been
made in the Treaty of Ghent concerning the North Atlantic Fish-
eries, and England's enormous fleet, released from the fear of
French invasion, was free to enforce what she deemed to be her
rights. Shortly after the treaty was concluded H. M. S. Jaseur
warned a vessel of the American fishing fleet to keep sixty miles
off the coast of Nova Scotia. American vessels were pursued
and seized and the peace seemed likely to be one of months rather
than of a century.
Mr. Adams, then Secretary of State, meeting the British Min-
ister one day upon the street, in 1818, and discussing the fisheries
situation with him, said that he believed that they "should have
to fight about it, and that his opinion was that they ought to do
so.",
The British Minister reports the conversation to the Foreign
Office and expresses doubt of Mr. Adams being able to carry the
country into a war to enforce rights which his own section, New
England, was chiefly, if not solely, interested in.
But there was to be no war. Another factor than that of
reprisal was coming into the councils of nations. Trade was to
be considered as well as glory.
Earlier, *hen Mr. Adams was Minister to the Court of St
James he had urged upon Lord Bathurst that "independent of
the question of rigorous right, it would conduce to the substantial
interests of Great Britain herself" to renew the fishing privileges.
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And speaking of New England, that "to another and perhaps
equally numerous class of: her citizens they (the fisheries)
afforded the means of remittance and payment for the produc-
fions of British industries and ingenuity imported from the manu-
factures" of England.
Lord Bathurst replied that though His Majesty's Government
could not concede the other positions taken by Mr. Adams, which
he enumerated, "yet they do feel that the enjoyment of the liber-
ties formerly used by the inhabitants of the United States may
be very conducive to their national and individual prosperity.
* * * And this feeling operates most forcibly in favor of con-
cession."
Giving all possible force to the generous dispositions of His
Majesty's Government toward the United States, it cannot be
doubted that its subsequent agreement on the fisheries was in-
fluenced by the fact that a prosperous America would be a better
customer than an impoverished one. At all events, the Treaty
of London was the result.
It is to be noted that in those years, 1815 to 1818, the first
Peace Societies were formed, so that suasion and trade marched
together.
There is an old saw which is still resonant, that "trade follows
the flag." In the old days it did. Conquest of territory was
not merely for conquest. The conquering nation excluded others
from trade with the acquired territory. One of the prime causes
of the Revolution was the strict limitation of American com-
merce to the products and manufactures of the old country, and
after the Revolution, down to 1830, the dependencies now con-
stituting Canada were prohibited by the mother country from
trading with us and we with them. Their ports were closed
and so were ours.
But a broader policy was seeking recognition Any country was
a better customer if it was rich and it could become rich by
general trade, more surely and more rapidly than by pent-up com-
merce, and so it was that by Orders in Council on the one hand
and by presidential proclamation on the other, the barrier between
Canada and the United States were thrown down and trade fol-
towed, hot the flag, but its natural channels. Twice since then
this freedom of trade has been endangered, once in 1870 when
General Grant asked Congress to give him power "should such
an extreme measure become necessary-to suspend the opera-
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tions of any laws whereby the vessels of the Dominion of Canada
are permitted to enter the waters of the United States." Later,
in 1887, the Congress made it the "duty" of President Cleveland
in case in his judgment our fishing vessels were "unjustly vexed
or harassed" in the enjoyment of their rights under the Treaty of
1818, "to deny vessels and crews of the British Dominions of
North America any entrance into the waters or ports of the
United States", and to deny entrance into this country of any
fish or other products of said Dominions. It was not necessary
that this authority should be exercised in either instance. The
Treaty of 1871 and the proposed Treaty of 1888 solved the sit-
uation.
Although the latter was only a proposal and was finally re-
jected, the modus therein determined upon and afterwards re-
newed was effective and a system of licenses to American fishing
vessels dispelled a war cloud. The pen is mightier than the
sword, and trade is mightier than war.
The fact is that trade itself had received a stupendous impulse.
The life of nations as well as individuals was being revolution-
ized. The handmaiden of trade is transportation, and trans-
portation was in process of change from the grub to the butterfly.
It is difficult for us now to realize the sluggard, snail-like pace
of commerce a hundred years ago. It hugged the coast in little
sloops and schooners. It was mired in roads which we today
would deem impassable. Trade was in the village and with the
nearby town. Commerce, as we know it, was non-existent. A
brig or ship of a few hundred tons came occasionally across the
seas. Fishing vessels of less than a hundred ton transported
their catch to foreign markets. Land communication was
meagerer still. Men on foot or horseback, or by stage, toiled
over roads which were hardly more than tracks.
In 1798 the total number of vehicles in Boston, coaches, chairs,
chaises and carriages, was one hundred and forty-five.
So late as 1826 Judge Story and Josiah Quincy, traveling to
Washington, were so fortunate as to make the journey in eight
days. Starting at five each morning and riding until well into
the night, they made the trip from Boston to New York in four
days, arriving in time for a late dinner, and Mr. Quincy writes
in his diary,
"It need not be said that we congratulated ourselves upon living
in the days of rapid communications and looked with commisera-
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lion upon the conditions of our fathers who are known to con-
sume a whole week in traveling between the cities."
The ocean voyage to England or to the Continent was a matter
of weeks instead of days. Washington Irving, writing of his
visit to England, says, "To the American visiting Europe the long
voyage is an excellent preparative."
In 1830 Boston had a fortnightly line of packets to Liverpool,
and New York was scarcely better off with its clipper ships.
Nations were isolated, provincial, suspicious, resentful, belliger-
ent.
The magic wand has been waived and space seems to have been
annihilated. A single ocean greyhound will transport in a few
days merchandise that fleets could not have carried in weeks a
century ago.
Commerce is fluid; international and not provincial. Mer-
chandise finds its level the world over with a change of pence or
farthings in its value.
Law has necessity for its basis. The community was forced
to protect its peace. It could i7ot permit men to fight out their
differences. The economic waste of personal conflict was too
disastrous and the community established courts to settle con-
troversies without bloodshed.
The world is rapidly becoming a community. Population
flows swiftly and easily between many parts of the globe.
Acquaintance between people of different nationalities is as great
today as that between those of adjoining counties in former time.
Commerce embraces the world. London and New York and
Paris and Berlin are great clearing houses. No disaster comes
to one but it is instantaneously felt by the others and by the
world. We are more and more interdependent. The same
necessity which compelled the establishment of courts and
tribunals in communities is irresistably forcing their establish-
ment between nations. Such courts are no longer the dreams of
philosophers and philanthropists. They are necessitated by the
ever increasing accord of nations.
It is a crude idea that such courts should exist merely to pre-
vent war. Hundreds of international controversies would never
lead to war, but it is nevertheless of vital importance that they
should be determined and settled once for all. Diplomacy is
constantly hampered by partisan and ill-informed popular opinion.
Foreign Offices cannot always reach adjustments, not because
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they cannot agree, but because politically it is not safe to agree.
Nations taking untenable positions cannot easily retire from them
without discredit. For the sake of good feeling and unimpeded
and unhampered trade, adjustment must in some way be reached.
In many controversies it is better that the controversy should be
settled wrong, or partly wrong, rather than left as a standing
menace, and so the nations have, with ever increasing frequency,
resorted to arbitration Beginning with the year 1820 the
recitdl is most impressive. Between that date and 1900 one
hundred and seventy-two important arbitrations took place.
Eight arbitrations mark the period from 1820 to 1840; thirty
arbitrations between 1840 and 1860; forty-four between 1860
and 1880; ninety arbitrations between 1880 and 1900. Many of
these, notably the Geneva and Halifax arbitrations in the seven-
ties, and that between Chile and Argentina, were most significant.
In 1853 the United States Senate voted to insert arbitration
clauses in treaties thereafter to be made, providing that the arbi-
trators should be "eminent jurists having little or no connection
with politics." In 1873 Parliament concurred in an address to
the Queen that she instruct the Foreign Secretary to invite all
nations to concur in a permanent system of arbitration. Similar
acts were passed in other countries. It remained, however, for
the Czar of all the Russias in 1898 to take the step which led to
a general scheme of arbitration. Pursuant to his invitation the
First Peace Conference met the following year and adopted the
convention which established the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
It has been said that this is not a court, and is not permanent.
In its actual structure it is only a clerk's office and a list of judges.
The convention does not even bind nations to arbitrate, but pro-
vides a convenient means by which arbitration may be carried
out. But the thing of vital import is that twenty-six of the
great powers originally, and now forty-four, agree "to use their
best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international dif-
ferences" and that before an appeal to arms they will "hdve
recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or
mediation of one or more friendly powers." They "deem it
expedient and desirable that one or more powers, strangers to
the dispute, should, on their own initiative and as far as circum-
stances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the
states at variance".
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Once for all, not St. Pierre or Bentham or Kant or James
Sullivan, but the nations of the earth, declare that "in questions
of a legal nature, and especially in the interpretation or applica-
tion of international conventions, arbitration is recognized by the
contracting power as the most effective and at the same time,
the most equitable means of settling disputes which diplomacy
has failed to setle." They say,
"International arbitration has for its object the settlement ot
differences between states by judges of their own choice, and on
the basis of respect for law."
"With the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to arbi-
tration for international differences"
they undertook to organize, and did organize, a tribunal
"accessible at all times and acting in default of agrement to the
contrary between the parties, in accordance with the rules of
procedure inserted in the present convention."
An international bureau is established which is to be the "chan-
nel for communications relative to the meetings of the court."
A course is mapped out for the selection of the judges for a given
arbitration and for the pleadings and procedure before them
unless the parties themselves have agreed upon some different
course.
The hesitancy of conflicting powers to suggest resort to the
tribunal is met by the provision that the signatory powers shall
"consider it their duty, if a serious dispute threatens to break out
between two or more of them, to remind these latter that the
Permanent Court is open to them", and they declare that
"The fact of reminding the parties at variance of the pro-
visions of the present convention, and the advice given them in
the highest interests of peace, to have recourse to the Permanent
Court, can only be regarded as in the nature of good offices."
From being an affront and sometimes a cause of war for a third
party to intervene, it becomes the duty of the third power
wherever such intervention is conceived to be of value. From
being the chance result of diplomacy a plan road to arbitration and
accord is marked out.
Twelve arbitrations stand thus far to the credit of the Perma-
nent Court. It is not to be expected that the docket of a world's
court will be overcrowded. 'Ihe procedure is expensive. It is
convened with deliberation. It is urged that it lacks, or may
lack continuity as to the principles underlying its decisions. But
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it can surely be said that those decisions have been made "on the
basis of a respect for law," and have been adjudications and not
diplomatic compromises. Though its decisions have no binding
force even upon future arbitrators drawn from its own panel, it
can hardly be doubted that practically they will be controlling.
It is well nigh certain, for instance, that the Pious Funds Case
fixes the doctrine of res adjudicata permanently in the court and
in international law. The same thing is true as to the limitations
on the doctrine of international servitudes pronounced in the
North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration.
It is true that no marshal or sheriff or international police is
provided to enforce the decrees of the tribunal, but it is provided
that the very agreement to arbitrate "implies the undertaking of
the parties to submit loyally to the award." Such submission in
the past has always taken place. Great Britain complained
bitterly of the Alabama Award of fifteen million, but the award
was paid. The United States with equal bitterness complained
of the five and a half million award at Halifax, but paid it,
nevertheless. Each party exercised its constitutional right to
denounce the court behind the court house, but it accepted the
result as private litigants do and as nations always must.
It is idle to talk of lack of sanction when we hear so much
of national honor and vital interests. No interest is so vital to
a nation that it can face the dishonor of disobedience to the man-
date of a court or tribunal to whose decision it has voluntarily
submitted itself.
The formation of the Permanent Court was not the only step
toward the accord of nations taken by the Conference of 1899.
As a rule variance between nations arises from a disagrement
concerning the facts, Each one of the contending parties of
necessity ascertains the facts ex parte and usually from partisan
and prejudiced sources. Oftentimes the exchange of evidence
between diplomatic offices fails to result in concurrence. The
peoples of the two countries gain little real knowledge through
the inflammatory statements of the daily press, and governments
the best intentioned find the situation out of hand. Usually if
the facts could be ascertained the cause for hostilities would
disappear.
No greater service was rendered by the Conference of 1899
than the provision for International Commissions of Inquiry.
Barring questions of honor and vital interests, the signatory
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powers declared that they deemed "it expedient that the parties
who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of
diplomacy, should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an
international commission of inquiry, to facilitate a solution of
these disputes by elucidating the facts by means of an. impartial
and conscientious investigation."
The delicacy of the situation is well illustrated by the reticence
of the language used. The nations do not bind themselves to
institute inquiry into their differences. The convention is declar-
atory and not contractual or oblijatory, but it goes forward to
provide a mode, elaborated by the Conference of 1907, for the
composition and procedure of the commission.
It would seem on the surface that little progress had been
made and that the Conference had been doing little more than
marking time. But this is only a superficial judgment based
on the cautious phrasing of international agreement. It marks
a distinct progress in the accord of nations. It furnishes a text
to which in times of strained relation either party to a contro-
versy may advert. Previous to its existence each party feared
that a proposal for inquiry would indicate a sense of weakness
and would be received at home, as well as in the opposing country,
as a badge of cowardice. To be able to point to such a mode
as having international sanction does much to insure accord.
More than this, it gives an interval for the blood to cool. In-
dividual conflict comes as often as otherwise from the fear that
the other party will shoot first. An invitation to visit the court
house and confer with the judge makes it highly improbable that
shooting will occur at all.
So much for the results of the Conference of 1899. It was
not contemplated when it adjourned that a further conference
would shortly be called. Further development was to be left to
the slow processes of time and diplomacy'. It is significant,
therefore, of the satisfaction fhat was felt in what it had done
and confidence that more could be accomplished that seven years
later, at the close of the war between Russia and Japan, the Czar
of Russia by common consent called a second conference and that
forty-four powers were represented by duly accredited delegates.
Its chief accomplishment was the establishment of a Court of
Prize, with a fixed body of judges. This was the great step.
During the last century nations had frequently agreed to arbitra-
tion, but in each instance had selected in one form or another the
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judges who were to sit. In private arbitration this is often
deemed a sine qua non, and so of arbitration between nations.
The advance made in this respect by the Convention of 1899 was
merely. that the nations agreed to establish a definite list and if
they arbitrated at all, to select the judges from that list. Beyond
that they were not prepared to go.
The Prize Court takes the next step. An actual court of
fifteen members is created with appellate jurisdiction from national
prize courts of last resort.. Great difficulty was experienced in
securing .greement as to the composition of the court and a
number of countries have not, for that reason, given in their
adherence to the convention, though accepting it in principle.
Certain countries, notably our own, found constitutional difficulty
in submitting decisions of their highest courts to reversal by a
foreign tribunal.' Whether this can be met by the proposal for a
proceeding de novo before the International Prize Court remains
to be seen. What is important to our present purpose, however,
is that thirty-three of the nations, including all but one of the great
maritime powers, accepted the convention and that now for the
first time in the history of the world there is "a really Permanent
Court of Nations with obligatory jurisdiction."
The Conference did not pause, however, with the establishment
of the Prize Court. In addition to it, and in addition to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, a Court of Arbitral Justice or
Judicial Arbitration Court, was proposed by the delegates of the
United States.
The subject has been so recently and so completely dealt with
by the distinguished Dean of this School, as well as by Dr. Tryon
in the pages of your LAw JOURNAL .that any general discussion is
superfluous. Nor is it necessary to the single consideration we
have at this moment before us. It is the marvellous progress
toward the accord of nations which is shown by the proposal
itself and by its well nigh universal acceptance in principle which
is important.
The Conference, in the time at its disposal, failed to agree upon
the composition of the Court, and the nations in the intervening
years have not proceeded with this proposal.
The fact remains, however, that in principle and in every detail
save one the nations of the earth have agreed upon a court of
extensive competency. We must not underestimate the difficulty
of agreeing upon that one detail. The difficulty is far greater
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than that involved in settling the composition of the Prize Court.
That court exists for a single purpose, and comes into operation
only in the event of maritime war. It chiefly concerns a few
of the great powers who are always to be represented upon the
court. The Arbitral Court concerns all nations in peace as well
as war. In any event, thirty to forty countries cannot usually
or commonly be represented if the court is to be of workable
size. The demand for equality of representation on the court
voiced by the Brazilian delegate, M. Barbosa, has recognized
force, but his counter-proposal for a court of forty-five judges,
divided into three sections of fifteen each, with three-year terms
of service, destroys the idea of permanency in judicial determina-
tion, which is one of prime importance. If our Supreme Court
were trebled in size and worked in triennial shifts it might gain
in kaleidoscopic variety of adjudication, but in nothing else.
The demand for representation on the court comes down from
the arbitration of the past. We are slow to free ourselves from
the accustomed. Probably our forbears had equal difficulty in
agreeing to a change from juries composed of friends of the
litigants familiar with the cause, to the impartial juries of today
unrelated to the parties and uninstructed in the cause.
It is a mistake to suppose that judges are or will be prejudiced
by nationality. Lord Alveston certainly brought impartial con-
sideratioh to the Alaska Boundary Case, as did Ju-'ge Gray and
Sir Charles Fitzpatrick to the Fisheries Case. Indeed it would
be quite impossible in recent arbitral decisions to find evidence of
prejudice or partisanship. Of course, if one country might have
a national upon the court and the other litigant nation not, there
might be ground for permanent refusal to adhere to the conven-
tion, but this is not the case, for it is provided that no judge is to
sit in a case to which his own country is a party. This single
detail should not be insurmountable and it may confidently bhe
hoped that the coming Conference at The Hague will find means
to its solution.
No review of the progress of nations toward mutual under-
standing and good will would be complete if the recent treaties
for general arbitration negotiated with Great Britain and France
were disregarded. This is not the occasion to consider them in
detail or to open the discussion which for a time has been closed
adversely by the action of the Senate of the United States.
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Our arbitration treaties with these countries, as with others,
followed closely the terms of The Hague convention, and excepted
from the agreement to arbitrate differences which affected "the
vital interests, the independence or the honor of the two con-
tracting states", and those which concerned the interests of third
parties.
What do "vital interests" and "honor" mean? Much or little,
according to the temper of the moment, or the interest of the
party interpreting them. When this country first made demand
on Great Britain for compensation for the depredations of the
Alabama and other privateers which had sailed from British
waters, Lord Russell replied that this demand concerned the
honor of Great Britain, of which only Her Majesty's Govern-
ment could be the judge. But a few years later it was found
entirely compatible with that honor to submit the question to
arbitration at Geneva. This was of course before there was any
treaty for arbitration. But since there has been one, Great
Britain has set us and the world an example of high mindedness
and broad statesmanship. In the negotiation for the Fisheries
Arbitration it must have been early apparent in the framing of
Question One that the United States would call in question the
right of Great Britain or its dependencies to legislate within its
own jurisdictional waters so as to bind American fishermen. No
question can concern national honor more clearly than that of its
own sovereignty, its right of legislation within its own jurisdic-
tion, but the question concerned the interpretation of a treaty
and Great Britain proceeded with the arbitration. The accord of
nations and the negligible character of the exception of national
honor were signally exemplified.
Why may not questions of honor be adjudicated? When do
interests which may be passed upon in court become so far vital
that they cannot be? What assurance can there be that they will
be more wisely or justly determined by submission to the chances
of battle, or worked out by years of continued friction? The
Code of Honor is no longer in force between men. Why should
it be between nations?
The proposal of the President of the United States was to
discard these time-worn exceptions and to arbitrate "all differ-
ences" * * * "which are justiciable in their nature by reason of
being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles
of law or equity." In no way has the good-will between nations
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been more emphatically shown than by the reception which this
proposal met on both sides of the Atlantic. The Prime Minister
of England and the leader of the opposition united in public
acceptance of the principle involved. Thousands of meetings of
celebration of the dawn of a new era of accord were held on both
sides of the water. It matters not that the proposal for the
moment failed. The proposal itself and its reception erected
new monuments to the accord of nations.
Samuel J. Elder.
Boston, Mass.
